DETECTING CIBIL ATTACKS USING PROOFS OF WORK AND LOCATION IN VANETS
Keywords:
create trajectories, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), attackers need to compromise an infeasible number of RSUs to create fake trajectoriesAbstract
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) have the potential to enable the nextgeneration Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). In ITS, data contributed by
vehicles can build a spatio-temporal view of traffic statistics, which can improve road
safety and reduce slow traffic and jams. To preserve drivers’ privacy, vehicles should
use multiple pseudonyms instead of only one identity. However, vehicles may exploit
this abundance of pseudonyms and launch Sybil attacks by pretending to be multiple
vehicles. Then, these Sybil (or fake) vehicles report false data, e.g., to create fake
congestion or pollute traffic management data. In this article, we propose a Sybil
attack detection scheme using proofs of work and location. The idea is that each road
side unit (RSU) issues a signed time-stamped tag as a proof for the vehicle’s
anonymous location. Proofs sent from multiple consecutive RSUs are used to create a
trajectory which is used as vehicle anonymous identity. Also, contributions from one
RSU are not enough to create trajectories, rather the contributions of several RSUs are
needed. By this way, attackers need to compromise an infeasible number of RSUs to
create fake trajectories. Moreover, upon receiving the proof of location from an RSU,
the vehicle should solve a computational puzzle by running proof of work (PoW)
algorithm. Then, it should provide a valid solution (proof of work) to the next RSU
before it can obtain a proof of location. Using the PoW can prevent the vehicles from
creating multiple trajectories in case of low-dense RSUs. To report an event, the
vehicle has to send the latest trajectory to an event manager. Then, the event manager
uses a matching technique to identify the trajectories sent from Sybil vehicles. Thescheme depends on the fact that the Sybil trajectories are bounded physically to one
vehicle, and therefore, their trajectories should overlap.
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