ANONYMOUS DATA LEAKAGE-RESILIENT IN MULTI-RECEIVER HYBRID DATA ENCRYPTION IN PUBLIC KEY SYSTEM

Abstract

A small portion of the secret keys used in cryptographic algorithms may be disclosed to attackers through side-channel attacks. In order to crack these current cryptographic systems, attackers have recently developed workable side-channel attacks. Researchers have made investments and put out a sound defense against these kinds of attacks, which is known as leakage-resilient cryptography. Recently, a number of publickey-based leakage-resilient anonymous multi-receiver encryption (LR-AMRE) techniques have also been developed. These LR-AMRE techniques, however, are not appropriate for a heterogeneous public-key environment, where a group of authorized receivers comprises a variety of receivers with different PKS configurations and secret/public key pairs. The first leakage-resilient anonymous heterogeneous multi-receiver hybrid encryption method (LR-AHMR-HE) for heterogeneous public-key system settings is proposed in this work. The LR-AHMR-HE technique is defined along with a novel framework and related adversary games. Adversaries are permitted to continuously intercept a small portion of secret keys during adversary games. Formal security proofs are presented under the adversary games to demonstrate that the suggested method is safe from two kinds of adversaries (malicious authorities and unauthorized users). The advantages of our method are illustrated through comparisons with a number of analogous prior designs.