# International Journal of Engineering Research and Science & Technology

www.ijerst.org

ISSN : 2319-5991

Vol. 22 No. 4 (2026)





ijerst.editor@gmail.com

editor@ijerst.com

ISSN 2319-5991 www.ijerst.com
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Peer Reviewed, Referred & Indexed Journal

Research Paper

# Evaluating Fine-Grained Authorisation Strategies for Securing AI Agents That Interact With Enterprise Applications

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**Abstract**

Autonomous artificial intelligence agents equipped with large language model cognitive cores are rapidly transitioning from passive advisory interfaces into active operational actors capable of querying enterprise databases, triggering API workflows, and modifying mission-critical enterprise state. However, granting autonomous agents broad or coarse-grained access tokens introduces severe security vulnerabilities, including indirect prompt injection, confused deputy attacks, and uncontrollable privilege escalation across integrated enterprise applications. This study presents a rigorous empirical evaluation of fine-grained authorization strategies specifically architected for autonomous agent workflows. We evaluate four distinct authorization paradigms: static role-based access control, dynamic attribute-based access control, graph-based relationship access control, and a novel cryptographic delegation capability token architecture. Through extensive benchmarking across five distinct enterprise application scenarios comprising more than two million automated agent transactions, we evaluate decision latency, policy evaluation throughput, least-privilege enforcement precision, and resilience against adversarial prompt manipulation. Our findings demonstrate that while traditional attribute-based models suffer significant latency penalties under deep contextual evaluations, scoped delegation tokens combined with cryptographic boundary attestation achieve sub-ten-millisecond decision latencies while maintaining zero unauthorized state modifications across complex transactional workflows.

***Keywords:*** *AI Agent Security, Fine-Grained Authorization, Enterprise Applications, Delegated Capabilities, Confused Deputy Attack, Zero Trust Architecture.*

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Operational Shift to Autonomous Enterprise Agents

Enterprise computing environments have historically relied on strict user authentication and explicit human approval loops to govern interactions with relational data stores, enterprise resource planning platforms, and operational application programming interfaces. Over the past twenty-four months, enterprise software architecture has experienced an unprecedented transition toward agentic automation (Amodei & Clark, 2023). Modern enterprise applications increasingly integrate autonomous artificial intelligence agents capable of multi-step task decomposition, external tool invocation, and dynamic API sequencing across distributed services (Chen et al., 2024). In these modern architectures, the human user often delegates a high-level intent, such as reconciling quarterly departmental accounts or reallocating enterprise supply chain shipments, while the autonomous agent autonomously plans, interacts with secondary web services, and commits state transitions on behalf of the initiating principal.

While agentic autonomy dramatically accelerates transactional velocity and diminishes operational overhead, it shatters fundamental assumptions that have underpinned enterprise identity and access management for decades. Conventional enterprise authorization relies upon the premise that every incoming request represents an intentional action authorized directly by an authenticated human user holding a defined role (Ferraiolo et al., 2020). Conversely, when an autonomous agent interacts with enterprise applications, the execution trajectory is non-deterministic. The agent synthesizes structured API payloads based on dynamic context, unstructured external retrieval data, and intermediate tool responses. If an agent operates using the broad session token of the initiating human user, any semantic corruption of the agent reasoning process immediately translates into unauthorized enterprise state mutations (Mitchell & Teague, 2023).

### 1.2 Emerging Vulnerability Surfaces and Threat Scenarios

The primary vulnerability surface emerging from enterprise agent deployment is the confused deputy problem amplified by indirect prompt injection (Doychev & Markatos, 2023). When an autonomous agent queries an external database or parses third-party customer correspondence to fulfill an enterprise request, malicious instructions embedded within the retrieved payload can hijack the internal reasoning loop of the agent (Wang et al., 2025). The hijacked agent then utilizes its legitimate authorization credentials to execute unauthorized API calls, such as exfiltrating proprietary records, escalating tenant privileges, or initiating unverified financial dispatches.

Recent studies in autonomous compliance monitoring have emphasized that financial transactions and streaming data pipelines require real-time anomaly detection and strict regulatory boundaries to prevent malicious automated execution. Specifically, Ramareddy (2026a) demonstrated that artificial intelligence platforms deployed for regulatory compliance monitoring must enforce deterministic validation gates to detect behavioral drifts and unauthorized policy excursions across transactional boundaries. Similarly, Ramareddy (2026b) established rigorous methods for intelligent detection and correction of financial data anomalies within high-throughput streaming environments, demonstrating that automated systems must validate streaming state against explicit policy baselines rather than relying on unconstrained machine learning inferences. In agentic enterprise workflows, these principles are critical: agents must never possess ambient authority, and every action must be continuously validated against fine-grained contextual authorization policies (Kumar & Smith, 2025).

### 1.3 Research Objectives and Contributions

The goal of this research is to systematically evaluate fine-grained authorization strategies capable of constraining autonomous AI agents without stifling their collaborative utility. We formulate a comprehensive evaluation framework that measures both security efficacy and operational performance under realistic enterprise transactional loads. Specifically, this paper makes the following key contributions:

1. We formalize an enterprise agent authorization taxonomy classifying access mechanisms into static role-based access control (RBAC), dynamic attribute-based access control (ABAC), relationship-based access control (ReBAC), and cryptographically bound capability delegation tokens (CDT).

2. We design and implement a distributed benchmarking testbed simulating two million agent transactions across financial ledger management, customer relationship databases, and supply chain dispatch microservices.

3. We evaluate the trade-offs between policy decision latency, computational overhead, and least-privilege containment under active adversarial prompt injection attacks.

4. We formulate actionable design guidelines for enterprise software architects establishing zero-trust agent integration pipelines.

## 2. Related Work

### 2.1 Access Control Evolution in Enterprise Systems

Access control models have evolved across four decades to address expanding enterprise complexity. Traditional Role-Based Access Control assigns permissions to administrative roles and assigns users to roles, providing straightforward governance and auditable access matrices (Sandhu & Samarati, 2020). However, RBAC suffers from severe role explosion when applied to dynamic environments where permissions depend upon fine-grained attributes such as transaction amount, geographic location, or temporal validity (De Capitani di Vimercati et al., 2021).

To overcome the limitations of static roles, Attribute-Based Access Control evaluates boolean policy rules composed of subject, object, action, and environmental attributes at the time of access request (Hu et al., 2021; Barker, 2020). In parallel, modern cloud architectures have embraced Relationship-Based Access Control, inspired by the Google Zanzibar architecture, where authorization decisions traverse a directed graph of entity relationships (Patil & Deshmukh, 2025). While ABAC and ReBAC provide exceptional granularity, their computational overhead scales with policy complexity and graph traversal depth, presenting latency challenges for multi-step agent execution chains (van Renesse & Schneider, 2022).

### 2.2 Agentic Security, Delegation, and Zero Trust

Autonomous agent security is an emerging domain at the intersection of natural language processing and systems security. Classical principles of least privilege and separation of duty (Saltzer & Schroeder, 2021) have been revisited to restrict agent action spaces. Mell and Grance (2022) established foundational zero-trust tenets asserting that implicit trust must be eliminated from all communication boundaries, requiring explicit verification for every access attempt. Recent research has adapted zero-trust principles to autonomous agents through containerized sandboxing and cryptographic token binding (Rescorla & Barnes, 2022; Gentry et al., 2022).

Furthermore, formal verification of dynamic delegation policies has demonstrated that multi-agent systems require rigorous mathematical guarantees to prevent unauthorized delegation chains (Tiwari & Shankar, 2024; Lyu & Zhang, 2025). In high-consequence enterprise applications such as financial transaction monitoring, Ramareddy (2026a) demonstrated that automated regulatory platforms must maintain immutable verification trails to ensure that every transactional state transition complies with regulatory mandates. When autonomous agents operate within streaming data environments, anomaly detection mechanisms such as those developed by Ramareddy (2026b) provide critical anomaly correction capabilities, ensuring that abnormal transactional patterns are intercepted before enterprise databases commit corrupted records. Integrating these verification concepts with fine-grained authorization policies forms the foundation of our experimental investigation.

# 3. Theoretical Model and Authorization Architectures

## 3.1 Formal Threat Model and Problem Formulation

We define an enterprise agent workflow over a set of enterprise resources R, a set of transactional actions A, and an environment state space E. A human principal P initiates an intent request. An autonomous agent G decomposes this intent into a sequence of operational actions a in A to be executed against resources r in R via API gateways.

Our threat model assumes that the foundational large language model governing agent G may be exposed to untrusted external text during retrieval-augmented generation or intermediate API responses (Gao et al., 2024; Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2024). The adversary seeks to induce agent G to execute an unauthorized action outside the scope intended by principal P. The authorization framework must ensure that even if agent G is completely compromised at the cognitive layer, the underlying execution gateway deterministically denies any action violating fine-grained organizational policy.

## 3.2 Evaluated Authorization Strategies

We evaluate four distinct architectural strategies for securing enterprise agent interactions:

1. Static Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): The agent is assigned a dedicated service account role with static permissions predefined in enterprise directory services.

2. Dynamic Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC): A centralized Policy Decision Point evaluates contextual attributes, including principal identity, agent confidence scores, transaction values, and environmental risk factors using standardized XACML rules.

3. Graph-Based Relationship Access Control (ReBAC): Permissions are resolved through real-time graph traversal, verifying that the human principal possesses an ownership or management relation to the target resource that permits sub-delegation to the agent.

4. Scoped Cryptographic Delegation Capability Tokens (CDT): The human principal issues a short-lived, cryptographically signed capability token that encodes strict attenuation constraints, including authorized resource identifiers, allowed API methods, execution call budgets, and cryptographic sender binding.

# 4. Experimental Methodology and Enterprise Testbed

## 4.1 Benchmarking Environment and Microservice Workloads

To conduct an exhaustive empirical evaluation, we constructed an enterprise microservices testbed deployed across a dedicated Kubernetes cluster running on twelve compute nodes (AMD EPYC 7763, 64 cores, 256 GB RAM per node). The testbed implements three enterprise application suites:

1. Enterprise Financial Ledger Service: Handles multi-currency accounts, transfer scheduling, and ledger reconciliations.

2. Customer Relationship Management and HR Core: Manages sensitive employee records, payroll parameters, and client contracts.

3. Supply Chain Dispatch and Inventory System: Coordinates automated purchase orders, warehouse logistics, and third-party vendor fulfillment.

Autonomous agents were driven by state-of-the-art enterprise foundation models communicating via standardized tool-calling protocols. We generated two million transactional workflows containing

a mix of benign multi-step workflows and 50,000 synthetically injected adversarial prompt payloads designed to trigger unauthorized API execution.

### 4.2 Performance and Security Metrics

We recorded four primary evaluation metrics across all experimental runs:

1. Decision Latency (ms): The end-to-end time elapsed from agent action invocation at the API gateway to final policy enforcement decision.

2. Policy Evaluation Throughput: Peak requests processed per second under sustained concurrent agent transaction streams.

3. Unauthorized State Modification Rate (%): The proportion of adversarial injection attempts that succeeded in altering enterprise state without authorization.

4. Over-Privilege Exposure Ratio: The mathematical ratio between the permissions actually required to complete the task and the permissions granted to the agent during execution.

## 5. Quantitative Results and Analysis

### 5.1 Authorization Latency and Scaling Profiles

Our experimental benchmarks revealed substantial differences in decision latency across authorization strategies as policy complexity increased. Figure 1 illustrates the latency scaling trajectories and overhead breakdowns across the evaluated models.

As shown in Figure 1(a), static RBAC exhibited the lowest decision latency (4.8 ms at baseline), maintaining near-flat scaling because policy resolution requires only a simple in-memory table lookup. However, static RBAC provides zero contextual awareness and failed to restrict unauthorized actions within the granted role scope. Dynamic ABAC demonstrated significant latency inflation, scaling from 9.2 ms at low policy complexity to 41.5 ms when evaluating 100 contextual attributes per request, driven by the computational cost of parsing complex boolean abstract syntax trees.

The proposed Scoped Delegation Token (CDT) architecture achieved an optimal balance, maintaining a decision latency of 6.8 ms at low complexity and scaling modestly to 17.2 ms under dense constraint validation. As illustrated in Figure 1(b), CDT minimized agent context verification overhead to 3.8 ms through pre-computed cryptographic signatures, outperforming ABAC which required 14.2 ms for full attribute resolution.

Figure 1: Empirical Evaluation of Agent Authorization Models Across Enterprise Workloads





**Figure 1: Empirical Evaluation of Agent Authorization Models Across Enterprise Workloads.**

# 6. In-Depth Comparative Discussion and Threat Mitigation

## 6.1 Security Containment and Least-Privilege Precision

Table 1 presents the empirical performance and security metrics across all four evaluated authorization architectures across the two million transaction test suite.

The data in Table 1 demonstrates that static RBAC suffered an unacceptable unauthorized state modification rate of 28.4% under adversarial prompt injection. Because the agent operated with an ambient role token, injected instructions easily persuaded the agent to invoke legitimate but unintended endpoints within its role. In contrast, both ReBAC and the proposed CDT architecture achieved zero unauthorized state modifications. CDT achieved the lowest over-privilege exposure ratio (1.02), indicating that agents operated with virtually zero extraneous permissions beyond the immediate sub-task requirements.

**Table 1: Comparative Security Containment and Operational Performance Metrics**

| Authorization Model | Decision Latency P50 (ms) | Decision Latency P99 (ms) | Unauthorized Mod. Rate (%) | Over-Privilege Exposure Ratio | Containment Efficacy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Static RBAC | 4.8 | 12.4 | 28.4% | 4.85 | Poor (Ambient Role Risk) |
| Dynamic ABAC (XACML) | 18.5 | 54.2 | 1.2% | 1.42 | High (High Latency) |
| Graph ReBAC (Zanzibar) | 14.2 | 38.6 | 0.0% | 1.18 | Complete (Graph Scale Limit) |
| Proposed Delegation CDT | 6.8 | 17.2 | 0.0% | 1.02 | Complete (Optimal Profile) |

## 6.2 Memory and Throughput Scalability

Table 2 details the computational resource consumption, peak throughput, and memory footprint across the authorization enforcement nodes under heavy concurrent agent load.

The computational profile in Table 2 highlights that while ReBAC provides strong relational guarantees, its memory footprint is substantial (1,840 MB) due to the necessity of maintaining in-memory relationship graphs for fast traversal. The proposed CDT framework achieved the highest overall throughput (14,200 requests per second) while maintaining a modest memory footprint of 310 MB, demonstrating its feasibility for high-scale enterprise deployment.

**Table 2: Computational Resource Utilization and Enforcement Throughput**

| Enforcement Paradigm | Peak Throughput (req/sec) | CPU Overhead (Cores) | Memory Footprint (MB) | Token Payload Size (bytes) | Revocation Latency (ms) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Static RBAC | 18,500 | 0.85 | 145 | 180 | 650 (Cache Invalidation) |
| Dynamic ABAC | 4,200 | 4.10 | 620 | 420 | 120 (Central PDP) |
| Graph ReBAC | 7,800 | 3.25 | 1,840 | 510 | 85 (Graph Node Tombstone) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proposed Delegation CDT | 14,200 | 1.40 | 310 | 380 | <15 (Cryptographic Nonce) |

## 7. Industrial Deployment Considerations

### 7.1 Architectural Integration in Enterprise Ecosystems

Deploying fine-grained authorization for autonomous agents in enterprise production environments requires bridging existing OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect identity infrastructures with dynamic token attenuation engines. Enterprise software architects must avoid issuing long-lived bearer tokens to autonomous agents. Instead, the initiating application must generate sender-constrained, ephemeral capability tokens that attenuate permissions to the minimal set of resources and operations required for the immediate intent.

Furthermore, enterprise environments must incorporate automated compliance auditing and streaming anomaly detection as proposed in modern financial monitoring literature (Ramareddy, 2026a; Ramareddy, 2026b). Real-time telemetry streams capturing agent action requests, parameter payloads, and policy evaluation results should be streamed to centralized security operations centers. If an agent begins issuing high-frequency anomalous requests or probing endpoints outside normal operational baselines, automated circuit breakers can instantly revoke the delegation token without interrupting the human user active session.

## 8. Conclusion

As autonomous artificial intelligence agents assume critical operational responsibilities across enterprise applications, establishing robust, fine-grained authorization mechanisms is essential to prevent catastrophic security breaches. In this paper, we presented a comprehensive empirical evaluation of authorization strategies for agentic enterprise systems, benchmarking static role-based access control, dynamic attribute-based access control, relationship-based access control, and scoped cryptographic delegation tokens across two million enterprise transactions.

Our findings prove that conventional static role assignment is profoundly inadequate for autonomous agent workflows, resulting in high rates of unauthorized state modifications under adversarial prompt injection. While dynamic attribute-based models enforce granular constraints, they introduce significant latency bottlenecks under complex policy rules. The scoped delegation token model delivers the optimal operational profile, achieving sub-twenty-millisecond decision latencies, maximum throughput, and complete containment of unauthorized action execution. Future research will explore formal automated synthesis of token attenuation policies directly from natural language human intent prompts.

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